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stimulate discussion and critical comments. References in 
publications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the 
authors to protect the tentative character of these papers. 
Because trade liberalization which is anticipated to be tempora.:ry creates a 
divergence between the effective domestic rate of interest and the world rate 
of interest, tariff reduction in the presence of international financial asset 
trade may reduce welfare for a small country. Calvo has argued that even 
though the government intends to liberalize trade pennanently, if the private 
sector believes with some probability that a tariff will be imposed in the 
future, then free trade may not be optimal. This paper first fonnalizes this 
argument and discusses the optimal policy for a government which seeks to 
maximize representative household welfare. 'Ihe government's lack of 
credibility is represented by a set of beliefs the private sector holds about 
the type of government it faces. Next, beliefs are endogenized by allowing the 
private sector to update them using Bayes' rule. In one approach, the true 
government's objective is maximize welfare for the economy, so that it does not 
seek to imitate another type, in contrast with other recent models of policy 
credibility. With learning, the government eventually adopts free trade,- even 
though restricted trade is optimal initially. 
We would like to thank Phil Brock, Michael Jones and Willem Buiter for 
useful comments. 
1. Introduction 
Trade liberalization which is anticipated to be temporary creates a 
difference between the effective domestic rate of interest and the world rate 
of interest. In some recent papers, Calvo (1985, 1986b) has demonstrated the 
second-best result that temporary trade liberalization, even in the absence of 
market power or distortions, may reduce welfare for a small col.ID.try. (Froot 
(1986) demonstrates a similar result.) Because a tariff will be reimposed in 
the future, there is an intertemporal distortion when financial assets can be 
traded internationally which may dominate the welfare-increasing effects of 
temporary tariff reduction. 
In another paper, Calvo (1986a) has argued that even though the 
government intends to liberalize trade permanently, if the private sector 
believes with some probability that a tariff will be imposed in the future, 
then free trade may not be optimal. Calvo takes the beliefs of the private 
sector as given exogenously. 
In this paper we first fonnalize Calvo's argument and discuss the optimal 
policy for a government which seeks to maximize a representative household's 
welfare. The government's lack of credibility with the private sector is 
represented by a set of beliefs which the household holds about the type of 
government it faces. The households perceive the possibility of two types of 
governments, one of which is ·the true one. We assume that there is a single 
false type, which is believed to select a tariff with a positive probability. 
1 
Households choose their constunption and saving plans to maximize expected 
utility, where the expectation is taken over the policies of the two types of 
governments, given their prior beliefs about the probabilities of which type 
they face. The true government also maximizes household expected utility; 
however, it knows its type, so that · the expectation is taken using this 
information. The government would ideally always choose free trade. Because 
their policy objectives are incredible, tariff imposition (i.e., 
non-liberalization) may lead to a higher level of household utility than free 
trade. 
We next endogenize learning by allowing the private sector to update its 
beliefs using Bayes' rule. Our approach is somewhat similar to that taken by 
Backus and Driffill (1985,1986), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Barro (1986) in 
their analyses of monetary policy. However, in our model the true 
government's objective is to maximize welfare for the economy rather than some 
arbitrary flll1ction. Furthermore, the true government does not increase its 
payoff by imitating another type -- our equilibrium is not the Kreps-Wilson 
repu1:.ational type. The true government's payoff is greater the larger is the 
probability perceived by the private. sector that they face the true type. 
In the presence of learning, Calvo's case· for non-liberalization is much 
weaker. If a government is cormnitted to maximizing welfare, then we show 
first that with learning, the private sector must be more skeptical initially 
(than without learning) for a tariff to be superior to free trade. We also 
show that there is a.11 upper botmd on the number of periods in which a tariff 
will be chosen by the welfare maximizing government. 
Section 2 presents a simple two-period model with a single consumption 
good. Calvo's argument is developed in the absence of learning. Learning 
2 
about the government's type is introduced. in section 3. In the single 
consumable model, there are no atemporal effects of trade policy. Section 4 
adds a second consumption good and a static welfare gain from free trade. The 
model is also extended beyond two time periods. Section 5 concludes. 
2. A Two-Period Model Without Learning 
The effects of private sector incredibility about the objectives of the 
government are introduced in a simple two-pericxi model of a small open 
economy. There is a single imported consumption good, which is not produced 
at home, and an export good (manna) which is not used domestically and is 
available in an exogenously fixed supply each period. The private sector is 
represented by a single household which maximizes the expectation of a 
discounted sum of utility of current consumption. The discount rate is 
constant and equal to the world rate of interest. 
The government's only role is to set trade policy and redistribute any 
tariff revenue in a lump-sum fashion. The government seeks to maximize the 
welfare of the representative household. However the government lacks 
that thecredibility with the private sector: the household believes 
government is the true welfare-maximizing one with positive probability less 
than lll1ity. For simplicity, we assume that the household believes the only 
alternative possibility is a government which adopts the rule: impose a 
tariff next period with probability q, or choose free trade for the next 
period with probability (1-q). 
Because we will. introduce learning by the household about the 
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government's true type, we restrict the policies which can be chosen in any 
period to a finite set. Otherwise, if the government selects a policy which 
has zero probability of being chosen by the alternative government, then the 
government's type will be fully revealed. For simplicity only two policies 
are assumed to be available -- free trade or a fixed positive tariff rate. 
Furthennore, taxes on foreign borrowing or capital controls are unavailable 
(see below) • 
The export good is chosen as numeraire. The representative household's 
utility is given by: 
where c and c are consumption in periods 1 and 2, respectively. V ( c) is 
1 2 
twice continously differentiable, increasing and concave and Pis the discom1t 
factor. V' (c) approaches infinity as consumption falls to zero and approaches 
zero as consumption rises toward infinity. The expectation is taken over the 
beliefs of the household about the government's type and respective behavior 
in period 2. 
The household has access to an international capital market, in which it 
can borrow or lend at given rate of interest, r. Any debt incurred in period 
1 nrust be repaid in full in period 2. We assume that the household's rate of 
discmmt equals the world rate of interest, so that P = ( l+r) -1 • Units for 
the importables and exportables are chosen so that their free trade price is 
l.lllity and the relative price of the import in terms of the export cum tariff 
is p > 1. 
The household solves 
~ {V(c1) + P[1l'V(c2) + (1-n)V(
c2)]} 
c ,x,c2 ,c1 2 
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subject to 
pc s y- (l+r)x+R.z,2 
and c 2 :
S y - (l+r)x, 
where n is the subjective probability that the tariff will be imposed in 
period 2, p 1 is the re
lative price of the import good in period 1, ~ R1_and .. 
R are the lump-sum transfers of period 1 and period 2 tariff revenue,
2 
respectively. If p is one, then R is zero. Planned consumption in period 2 
1 1 
is given by c in the event a tariff is imposed in the second period and by c 2 2 
in the event of free trade in the second period. The first period current 
account deficit is given by x, and y is the amount of manna available each 
period. 
The household equilibrium conditions are: 
(1) 
(2) c + c /(l+r) = y(l + 1/(l+r)), and1 2 
(3) 
The equilibrium conditions R = (p -l)c and R = (p-l)c have been used in1 1 1 2 2 
the second and third equations. 
The government chooses trade policy in each period to maximize household 
welfare, which is expected utility. However, the government knows its true 
type, so that its objective function is 
In the second period, the true government is indifferent between free trade 
and a tariff because there is no static tariff distortion in this special 
5 
model. There are only intertemporal distortions in the presence of 
international asset trading induced by the government's lack of credibility. 
We will assume that the true government always chooses free trade in period 2, 
because this choice would always be optimal in the last period for a small 
country if there were multiple consumption goods. The subjective probability 
that the tariff is imposed in period 2, n, is the product of the probability 
that the false government imposes the tariff, q, and the perceived probability 
that the government is the false type, (1-l). 
The true government's problem is to choose p, from the set {1,p} to 
maximize the value of W, given the resultant expected utility maximizing 
constnnption behavior of the househol9-. Equation (1) implies that if 11 exceeds 
zero and free trade is selected in the fi°rst period, then consumption in 
period 1 exceeds y and consumption in period 2 is less than y. That is, the 
country borrows from abroad since the effective market rate of interest faced 
by the household is less than the world rate of interest. 
If ff is zero, then free trade in the first period (p = 1) achieves the1 
first-best allocation of consumption over periods, and if ff is unity then the 
tariff achieves the first-best. In both these cases, the intertemporal terms 
of trade for the household are identical to the foreign terms, (l+r), so that 
there is no intertemporal distortion and consumption is the same in each 
period. When n is· between zero and one, there is a welfare loss due to the 
intertemporal distortion created by the government's lack of credibility tmder 
either free trade of the tariff. 
In this model, any policy which brings the effective rate of interest for 
households into equality with the world rate of interest eliminates the 
intertemporal distortion and achieves the first-best outcome. One such policy 
6 
is an intennediate tariff which yields a domestic relative price of the 
importable between one and p. However, our motivation is the problem of trade 
liberalization when the private sector is skeptical about the government's 
resolve to stay with the liberal regime. If the private sector assesses 
probability ff to a return to the old status quo and probability 1-ff that 
whatever liberalized regime is chosen will be maintained, then our set-up is a 
simple representation of the optimizing government's problem. The two 
possibilities perceived by households are simply normalized to yield relative 
prices, 1 or p. Therefore, we exclude the possibility that the true 
government can select a tariff rate other than one of the two rates the false 
government might select. 
Other policies which alleviate the intertemporal distortion are capital 
controls, as noted by Calvo (1985). An optimal policy is to impose a tax on 
foreign borrowing (lending) along with free trade (tariff), so that 
consumption is just equal across periods. In the presence of a static 
distortion under a tariff (substitution in production or const.nnption), free 
trade and a tax on foreign borrowing of the appropriate magnitude can achieve 
a first-best allocation. For the remainder of this paper, we assume that 
capital controls are infeasible, or that taxes on international asset 
transactions can be evaded. 
The government chooses between free trade and the tariff to maximize 
household utility, cognizant of how the household subsequently consumes and 
saves. The value of social welfare in the case of free trade in the absence 





-1 -1(6) c 1 + (l+r) = y(l + (l+r) ), wherec 2 
f> = ff(l/p) + (1-11). 
'Ih.e ftmetion ,p is the ratio of the world market discount factor to the 
domestic effective discount factor and is always less than or equal to one. 
w (ff) achieves a maximum for 1t equal to zero and is monotonically decreasing1 
in 1t. To see this, note that differentiation of equations (4) , ( 5) and (6) 
yields: 
Equation (5) implies that V' (c1) < V' (c2), so that, with strict concavity of 
V(c), dW1Jdn < 0, for all 1t >O. 




-1 -1(9) c 1 + (l+r) c = y(l + (l+r) ),2 
where p ~ p · ,p ~ 1. W (ff) achieves a maximum when n equals one and is p 
monotonically increasing in ff. This is derived from differentiation of 
equations (7) , (8) ·and (9) which yield 
Since in this case (8) implies that V' (c ) > V' (c ), dWP/dn > O, for all n<l.1 2 
'Ih.e values of social welfare are depicted in Figure 1 for both the free 
trade and tariff cases. The value of 11, ff* , such that the two are equal is 
greater than one-half. To see this, first note that since the rate of time 
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preference equals the interest rate, and utility is concave, the farther c
1 
or 
c deviate from c =c 2 =y, the lower is social welfare. When free trade is2 1 
chosen in the first period by the government, c > y and there is dissaving,1 
while c
2 
< y. Let us call the choice of consumption in the first period under 
free trade c', and the choice of consumption in the second period under free 
(first period) trade C * • From the first order conditions, V' (c' ) = 
(1/2)(1+(1/p))V' (c*). When a tariff is chosen in the first period, then c <1 
y and 02 > y. Note that if c* were consumed in the first period, and c' were 
constnned in the second period, that the first-order conditions would not be 
satisfied. It would be the case that V' (c*) < (1/2)(1+p)V' (c') = 
(1/4) (l+p) (1+(1/p) )V' (c*) because ( l+p) (1+(1/p)) (1/4) > 1. Therefore, it is 
the case that the first period consumption is less than c* (because utility is 
concave, a lower first-period consumption is needed to achieve the first-order 
condition) • Hence, when the tariff is imposed at n = 1/2, the consumption 
bundle is farther from the optimum and welfare is lower. Thus at n = 1/2, w1 
> W p and the intersection must occur to the right of one-half. 
I;f the private sector's beliefs in period 1 are that the joint 
probability of the government being false and imposing a tariff in period 2 is 
greater than rr*, then the true optimizing government will impose a tariff in 
the first period. Otherwise, free trade in the first period will be optimal. 
In the case that q is less than one-half, free trade will be optimal in period 
1 for all prior subjective probabilities that the government is the true type. 
Example: Let utility display constant relative risk aversion with the 
·coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to two: 
-1V(c) = -c . 
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Ii> 
= -----, where p is the 
{p + 1 
domestic price-ctm1-tariff of the constuna.ble. For all ri > 11 * ' 
and for all ff < ff * , w1(ff) > Wp('"). 
3. Two-Period, Single Consumable Model with Learning 
We now introduce learning by the private sector about the government's 
type using Bayes' Rule. The household updates its beliefs about the type of 
government given the observation that if the government is the true one, it 
has acted optimally in the first period. The updating rules given that free 
trade or a tariff is optimal for the true government are straightforward. We 
asstnne that the government knows the household's prior beliefs and that the 
household recognizes that the true government chooses between the tariff and 
free trade optimally given the posteriors that will be formed by the 
household. 
If the parameters of the economy are such that a tariff is optimal for 
the first period, t..hen t..he prior probability that a tariff is imposed in 
period 1 is given by 
where .:t0 is the prior probability that the government is the true type. This 
prior comes from the facts that true government chooses a tariff with 
probability one (because we are talking about the case in which a tariff is 
optimal) and the false government chooses a tariff with probability q (it has 
the same probability of choosing a tariff in period 1 and period 2) • Using 
Bayes' rule, the posterior that the government is the true one once it is 
10 
I 
revealed that there is a tariff in place in period 1 is 
Therefore, the posterior n, the subjective probability that a tariff will be 
~posed in period 2, in this case is 
where '"o was the prior probability of a tariff in period 2 (the subjective 
probability of a tariff in period 2 before the tariff in period 1 was revealed 
= q(t-:t )). This is because the probability that the true government will0 
impose a tariff in the second period is zero, while the probability that the 
false one will is q, 
In other words, households know what the true government would do if it 
were in power. They know the parameters of the model, so they know if a 
tariff is the optimal choice by the true government if it is in power, In 
this case it is optimal to put on a tariff, Prior to observing the tariff 
that is actually chosen by the true government J households have some prior 
probability that the true government is in power. After it is revealed that a 
tariff is imposed in period 1, they update their priors. Consumption 
decisions are made in period 1 after the tariff is revealed. Because the 
(true) government has full information, they make their tariff choice in 
period 1 lrnowing how consl.Ilners will update their priors. 
If the :r;arameters of the economy are such that free trade is optimal in 
period 1, then the prior probability that free trade will be observed is 
The posterior probability that the government is the true one, after having 
observed free trade in period 1 is 
11 
,.. 
Therefore, the posterior 1r, the subjective probability of a tariff being 
imposed in period 2, in this case is 
- A AFor O < n < q, both n and n 
1 
are less than n • Note that i ~ 1r for a0 1 0 1 1 
given prior n
0
, as long as l exceeds zero.0 
~ There will be a prior n 
0
, call it n, that gives rise to posteriors such 
This is the point where the government is just 
indifferent between putting on a tariff or not. For greater prior 
probabilities of a tariff it will definitely put on a tariff, and for lesser 
prior proba.bilities it will definitely not put on a tariff. The following 
proposition shows that ;;> 1r*. That is, the prior probability that makes them 
indifferent between putting on a tariff and not with learning is greater than 
the prior probability that made them indifferent without learning. Hence, 
with learning, the household has to be initially more skeptical before the 
government is induced to put on a tariff in period 1. 
A -Proposition 1: If O < l 0 < 1, the prior 1r such w1(n) = WP(n) exceeds the 




(~) =WP(n), it is not the case that ~ = i = n*. ~ =n only when 
q = 1/2, but as mentioned above, when 1r: n*, q > 1/2. 
* * *When n "' n , then max (W ,wp) > w (n ) = Wp(n ) . By the monotonicity of1 1 
* * w and WP, if. 1r < 1r * , then w > W(n ) (the common value of w (n * ) and WP(n ) ) 1 1 1 
and a zero tariff would be chosen and if n > n*, then W p > W(n*) and a tariff 
would be chosen in period 1. 
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Hence at the t . " and fr- sueh that w fr = WP(-)n both are greaterpos eriors fr <")1 
than W(fr*) • In particular, W 
p 
(ff) > W(fr*) , which from monotonicity implies ff > 
* ~ - ~ * ff • Since fr > ff, 1t > 1r • 
4. Model with Two Consumption Goods 
In the model of the previous sections, there was no atemporal distortion 
created by tariffs. The only distortion was in the saving behavior of the 
household. '!his arose because the household was dubious about the motives of 
the government and perceived a possible change in trade policy in the next 
period. Extension of the model to include a static distortion in consumption 
from the tariff is possible. In such a case·, the true government will always 
choose free trade in the last period. For positive values of ff, tariff 
imposition in the first period can partially offset the intertemporal 
distortion.· However, it also introduces an additional atemporal welfare 
reduction. In the one good case, there always exist possible priors for which 
choosing the tariff in the first period is superior to free trade (e.g., n = 
1) ·• When there are two consumption goods, free trade may or may not be a 
superior policy for all prior beliefs. 
Adding a second consumable to our two-period model is straightforward. 
For simplicity, the country is completely specialized in production of the 
export good, which is taken as numeraire. Output of the exportable is 
exogenous and constant, and both the importable and exportable are constnned. 
Household utility is again intertemporally separable, and the discotmt rate is 
equal to the given world rate of interest. We write the utility of current 
consumption in indirect fonn and assume that units are chosen so that the 
13 
world relative price of the importable is tm.ity. 
Because free trade will always be chosen by the true government in the 
second period, social welfare tm.der time-consistent policy is given by: 
where 1 is consumption expenditure in period 1 valued at domestic price p1,1 
and z is consumption expenditure in period 2 valued at the world (and true
2 
domestic) price, one. 
The representative household maximizes expected utility, given prior 
beliefs stmJ111arized by n. The first-order conditions for maximization yield 
av ( p, 1 2 > = + 1( -----
812 
z = y - (l+r)x, and
2 
= y - (l+r)x + R..z,12 
and R = (p - 1 )c2 2 , in equilibrium. Planned2 
consumption of good 2 in period 2 in the event of a tariff in period 2 is 
equal to c
2 
2 • The superscript refers to the second good. 12 is consumption 
expenditure valued at domestic prices if there were a tariff. The current 
accotmt deficit in period 1 is given by x. 
We now assume that the utility from current period consumption is 
homothetic and displays constant relative risk aversion. Indirect utility in 
each period is given by: 
(v(p)I)l-0'
V(p,l) = 1-0' 
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where v' (p) < 0 and a > O. Also we define 
2 a = (p-1 )c /I, 
where the superscript 2 refers to the second good, so that expenditures 
measured in world prices and measured in domestic prices for the same 
constnnption btmdle are related by 
z = (1-a.)I. 
The first-order conditions for household optimization yield: 
(10) 
1 (i.e., free trade is chosen in period 1) and 
( 11) 
if p = p (i.e., the tariff is imposed in period 1).
1 
The values of the true government's objective function are: 
for free trade in period 1, 
and 
for the tariff in period 1, 
a
where '1' = (z2/z ) , in the presence of free trade,1 1 
a
'Pp= (z2/z1) , in the presence of the tariff, 
1r = [(v(p)/(l-a.)v(l)]l--<1, and B = y(l + (l+r)- ). We have used the fact 
15 
that 
1/a -1= B· (1 + /3'/>i ) , for i = 1,p.z1 
It is useful to notice that (r-1) / ( l-0') is a measure of the atemporal 
welfare loss from a tariff since this quantity equals 
which is the difference between the utility for some given level of 
expenditure measured at world prices when a tariff is in place and when it is 
not. This quantity must be negative. 
For many cases, equations ( 10) and ( 11) imply that if n is between zero 
and one, then expenditure measured at world prices will be less (greater) in 
period 2 than in period 1 when free trade (the tariff) is adopted in pericxi 1. 
The possibility exists that the opposite effects occur for particular 
combinations of tariff magnitude, elasticity of substitution between 
commodities, and coefficient of relative risk aversion, as long as the latter 
is greater than unity. In such instances, social welfare with the tariff, 
W (n) , is monotonically decreasing in n, so that free trade in period O is p .· 
superior to the tariff for all values of n. Therefore, we restrict our 
attention to cases in which z1 
is greater than z
2 
if free trade is adopted in 
period 1, so that free trade leads to a current account deficit in the first 
period, as in the one-good model. That is, we restrict attention to cases in 
which r(l-a.) < 1. This will always hold if a is less than one. 
w (n) is monotonically decreasing in n and has a derivative equal to
1 
zero for n equal to zero. However, W ( 1t) has a ma.xi.mum value for some value p 
of n between zero and one. 
Because the static distortion is created by tariffs, free trade may be 
16 
superior to the tariff for all prior beliefs about the government's type. 
If the tariff is superior to free trade for some possible beliefs, then 
it is the optimal policy all exceed one-half.those values of 11 for which 
This follows from the one-good model, since the presence of the atemporal 
welfare effect can only reduce the benefits of tariff imposition. Figures 
2(a) and 2(b) display curves w (ff) and Wp(n) for two possible cases. 1 
~ A 
Proposition _g: The least prior value of n between O and 1 such that W (ff) = 1 
w2 (n), if it exists, under Bayesian lea
rning exceeds the prior ff* such that 
w (ff*) = w (ff*) in the absence of learning.
1 2 
Proof: Because W (n) is not monotonically increasing in n, the argument for p 
A -
Proposition 1 is insufficient. The possibility arises that w(n) = Wp(n) for1 
values of Aff and 1r - less than 11 * • However, if q > 1/2, t~en the Bayesian 
updating rules imply that n > ;; • Whenever q ~ 1/2, free trade in the first 
period is superior to the tariff for the true government (ff must be less than 
1/2). Since w (ff) > Wp(1t) for any n < ff*, if w (n ) = w (ff ) for some n 1, n-1 1 1 2 2 2 
< n * , then n 1 > n 2• Any other possibility is ruled out because w
 (n) is
1 
- A - * 
monotonically decreasing. Therefore, ff> n implies that n must exceed n , and 
~ - * ff)1f)ff. 
The two-period model can be extended to an arbitrarily long finite 
horizon or an infinite horizon model. With learning, each period that the 
true government chooses its optimal policy, the prior belief that it is the 
false type is reduced. This is true whether the optimal policy is free trade 
or tariff imposition in any given period. If tariff imposition is optimal 
given the initial prior, then, in the absence of learning, it will always be 
the optimal policy until the last period (or always, if the horizon is 
17 
infinite.) However, when the household updates its beliefs about the 
government's type after observing the policy chosen each period, if the 
horizon is long enough free trade will eventually become the optimal policy 
choice. This is true even when the tariff is the best policy in early 
The multi-period extension of the model is straightforward. The 
household maximizes 
T
with respect to consumption expenditures {It}t=O' subject to 
T t T tL (It/(l+r) )-s L ((Rt+ y)/(l+r) ), 
t=O t=O 
t -1
where Rt = (pt - 1) · c2 and /3 = (1-r) • The expectation is taken with respect 
T 
to the sequence of domestic relative prices, {pt} t=O' which are random 
variables for the incredulous household. The household !mows the objective of 
the true government (but assesses less than probability one to the government 
being this type), so that it can calculate the pa.th of policies chosen by both 
the true type and false type recognizing how its own beliefs will be updated. 
At time T, the true government's objective is given by 
where It is the actual consumption expenditure of the household given the 
policies chosen. The government selects a policy sequence, {pt}i=O' which is 
the optimal time consistent one given the updating rules and initial (time 0) 
18 
priors of the private sector. The horizon T can be infinity. 
The Bayesian updating rules are unchanged. F.ach period that the true 
government chooses the policy which is optimal, the prior belief, A, of the 
household that it is the true type rises. For a given initial prior, A0 
, 
greater than zero, the number of periods for the prior, At' to decline to any 
value less than unity is finite. Therefore, even if the tariff is optimal 
initially, for a large enough T, free trade will become a superior policy in a 
bounded number of periods and it will be selected thereafter. This is 
summarized as: 
Proposition ~ For the infinite horizon problem, if AO > O, the number of 
periods such that the tariff is the optimal policy is boilllded by a finite 
number K. K will depend upon the parameters of the model. 
Proof If n = (1-A )q is zero, then the first-best is achieved by the policy
0 0 
00 
sequence, {pt= l}t=o· Let q > 0, and denote the value of social welfare under 
this policy of free trade as a function of AO' W(A 0 ). Fur
thennore, for any 
- 00 -
alternative policy sequence, {pt}t=O' such that 3 t < ro for which pt= p, the 
value of social welfare W(A ) is strictly less than W(A ) for AO= 1. Strict0 0 
1 2
concavity and twice-continuous differentiability of U(c ,c ) imply that W(A )0 
is continuous in A0
• Continuity of W therefore implies there exists A* < 1 
such that W(A ) > W(:\. ) for all AO > :\. *, where the policy generating Wis Po = 0 0 
p and pt = 1, V t ?: 1. This implies that given At > A*, at any time t, the 
optimal time-consistent policy thereafter is free trade as long as A > A* for s 
all s ?: t. This condition holds by the Bayesian updating rules which imply 
that both X and A exceed A 1 , the prior:s p s-
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The dynamic behavior of the current accmmt can be inferred in the normal 
case we consider (that is, an anticipated future tariff induces a current 
accmmt deficit) . If the tariff is a superior policy given initial prior 
beliefs, than a current accotmt surplus occurs since there is a perceived 
positive probability that free trade will be chosen in a subsequent period. 
As the prior probability that the government is the false type falls with 
learning, the intertemporal distortion created by the tariff increases and the 
current account surplus rises. Once free trade becomes optimal, the current 
accmmt goes into deficit because the private sector perceives a positive 
probability of a tariff the next period. With learning, this probability 
declines, sot.hat the current account deficit falls toward zero. Since the 
optimal saving path followed by the economy depends upon the initial prior 
beliefs of the household, the steady-state wealth and constnnption also depends 
upon the initial priors. 
5. Conclusion 
When a government is in power that wishes to maximize the welfare of 
consuners, but the consumers do not believe that is the government's goal, a 
distortion is introduced into the economy. In the models we have examined, 
the misperception is about future tariff policy. The incredulity of 
households creates an intertemporal distortion. 
A first-best policy to remove this distortion-~ such as a tax on foreign. 
20 
borrowing is not available to the government. As a second-best policy it 
may be desirable to impose a tariff, if the atemporal distortion is smaller 
than the intertemporal distortion. 
The optimizing government cannot reach the first-best solution under the 
constraints we have postulated. Therefore, even when it implements the best 
policy among the ones it has at its disposal, a distortion remains. However, 
we have shown that the mere act of choosing policy optimally over time reduces 
the size of the externality. This is true even if the optimal policy is to 
choose a tariff currently. By acting optimally, the government establishes 
credibility. A government cannot achieve credibility instantaneously -- it 
must do so over time by choosing the policy which is best for the public. The 
public will begin to recognize the benificence of the government, even if it 
is imposing a tariff, if that tariff is the best choice the government can 
make. (The irony is that the skepticism of the public is what forces the 
government to choose a tariff, and is what keeps the economy away from an 
unconstrained Pareto optiml.Uil.) 
~e presence of learning generally weakens the case for a tariff as a 
policy to deal with the intertemporal distortion caused by household's 
incredulity. First, the public must initially be more skeptical about the 
good intentions of the government (as compared to the case without learning) 
for it to be optimal to impose a tariff, Second, over time with learning it 
is inevitable that free trade becomes the best policy. 
21 
References 
Backus, D. and J. Driffill, 1985a, "Rational Expectations and Credibility 
Studies 52 (April),Following a Change in Regime," Review of Economic 
211-221. 
Backus, D. and J. Driffill, 1985b, "Inflation and Reputation," American 
Economic Review 75 (June), 530-538. 
Barro, R., 1986, "Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete 
Information," Journal of Monetary Economics 17 (January), 3-20. 
Barro, R., and D. Gordon, .1983, "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model 
of Monetary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (July), 101-121. 
Calvo, G., 1985, "On the Costs of Temporary Liberalization/Stabilization 
Experiments," forthcoming Journal of Developnent Economics. 
Calvo, G., 1986a, "Incredible Reforms," University of Pennsylvania. 
Calvo, G., 1986b, "Temporary Stabilization: Predetermined Exchange Rates," 
Journal of Political Economy 94 (December), 1319-1329. 
Froot, K., 1986, "Credibility, Real Interest Rates, and the Optimal Speed of 













0 ,-rr* -,,-''2 
'vi. (7r}'W l 
o_____________ _JL__ , 
7T
(a) 
w, ( 7T} 
0 ____________ _J___,_ 
Cb) 7T 
